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Group History

Bowman Diary Page 04

Bowman Diary - Page 04
 Page 1   Page 2   Page 3   Page 4   Page 5   Page 6  Page  7   Page 8   Page 9   Page 10

This is the diary of Major Marvin Bowman as compiled by Paul West.
Jan Riddling, 100th Bomb Group Historian, reformatted this version in July 2003.

 Oct 28, 29, 1943

S-2 spent the last two days moving into the Old Operations building - no operations scheduled.

Oct 30, 1943

Group briefed for Rhur - mission scrubbed after planes in the air for 2 hours. Weather - Party tonight celebrating the 100th's first birthday.

Oct 31, 1943

The 100th was one year old yesterday. During the week each Squadron will hold and anniversary party and dance. Last night at the Officers Club the official celebration was held - quite ultra. Lavish food display; unlimited fried chicken and a black market roast pig, complete with apple was featured. Was a party to end all parties and many have taken the pledge. Today the bike race around the perimeter was won by the 418th's Sgt. Van Gemit and the tug of war won by a team from the 351st. In the evening the USO show was proceeded by a Lair's contest, won by S/Sgt Malouit from the 418th, Lt. C. W. Terry from S-2, and Capt. Elton, Commanding Officer of the 350th. Not much official business on the station today.

Nov 1, 1943

Not even a practice mission today. Weather - same old fog. Major John Bennet of San Antonio, Texas reported for duty - was given P/W talk by Capt. Burr. X-mas packages beginning to arrive.

Nov 2, 1943

Fog, but warmer. S-2 staff pretty well settled into new quarters - several of the buzzers actually work.

Nov 3, 1943

Briefed for Wilhemshaven at 0700 hours. Twenty-eight A/C dispatched. Group returned at 1530 hours - no losses - no fighters - little flak. Bombed with PFF and the results are unknown. It was the largest number of US planes every over Germany - nearly 1000. Colonels E. B. Garland and W. B. Burgess of the 8th AF Intelligence here to see mission results. Guest of Colonel Harding, their classmate at West Point.

Nov 4, 1943

Mission to Gelsenkirchen scrubbed account of weather.

Nov 5, 1943

Group went to Gelsenkirchen. 32 planes including 4 spares. Seventeen planes over the target. T/Sgt Boyle, radio operator on the Hughes crew killed by flak, hit near collar bone - just where flak suit protections stops. Martin's plane missing. Flesh and Gossage landed at Tangmere, England with damaged plane. Other eight crewmen bailed out on orders over Germany. This included Lt. OMar Gonzalas, Group Navigator and T/Sgts Pope and Brewster of the heroic Reeder crew.

Nov 6, 1943

Heavy rain - cold - mission scrubbed.

Nov 7, 1943

Despite hard rains this morning the Group took off for Duren. No fighters and little flak. PFF used even though target was fairly clear - bombing results reported as poor.

Nov 8, 1943

Paris mission scrubbed after Group airborne for one hour. Weather over target unsuitable.

Nov 9, 1943

Beautifully weather but no mission. PFF plane which was to have led the scrubbed mission took off about 1000 hours, and crashed from low altitude on the first turn out of traffic near Eye. Crew of thirteen killed and cremated along with three British civilians working in sugar beet field. Aircraft said to have been on fire on landing and pilot apparently tried to make Eye, where a new runway is under construction - about 300 yards short. Plane loaded with phosphorus bombs, which accounted for intense fire. Most of the crew huddled in radio room probably braced for a crash landing. Colonel Harding would have flown in this PFF aircraft had the mission not been scrubbed.

Nov 11, 1943

Group celebrated Armistice Day by starting a large scale raid on Munster, led by Colonel Harding. Weather closed down over Channel and mission recalled without crossing the enemy coast. Fred Barton of The American Legion Weekly, here to interview members of Blakely's Provisional Group.

Nov 12, 1943

No mission today. Two photographers from VIII Bomber Command here to photograph Bombardiers - selected Douglas and Big Joe Amranini.

Nov 13, 1943

Group took off shortly after 0700 hours for Bremen - briefed by Bowers and Major Shaw. Weather here fairly good. Returned at 1345 hours - mission unsuccessful - PFF plane went sour on all points and Colonel Harding almost died from anoxia. Bombed "enemy fish" in North Sea.

Nov 14, 15, 1943

Capt. Bowman and Lt Schwarz to photo school at Chaddinton - no missions either day.

Nov 16, 1943

Target: Rjukin, Norway with takeoff at 0600 hours. All planes returned shortly after 1700 hours. Target hit hard - everybody happy. Other groups were hit over Oslo and two bombers were reported lost. Strike photos not too clear due to overcast and critical points - reports on general and particularly eye witnesses indicates the German Heavy Water Plant was hit squarely - main building and penstocks destroyed. Pilot Jack Swartout made a second run on the target and reported the target area in flames. Explosions jarred planes 9000 feet high. (The lead pilot on this mission has been listed as Barr and on other reports as Swartout - in fact the mission was led by Lt. Owen D. "Cowboy" Roane. . . pw)

 

HEADQUARTERS
ONE HUNDREDTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H), AAF
Office of the Operations Officer
APO # 634

17 November 1943
SUBJECT:Operational Narrative for Mission of 16 November 1943. 
TO:Commanding Officer, 100th Bombardment Group (H), Army Air Forces.

1. We took off at 0625 hours. We climbed individually to 12,000 feet and rendezvoused over Splasher # 6. There were only twelve ships, but four more joined us before we arrived at Splasher # 4.

2. We were twelve minutes early at that point so made a 360 degree turn and picked up six more ships, making a total of nineteen two of these were from other groups. One had an "A" on it's tail and the other and "O":

3. We climbed to 16,000 feet trying to clear the overcast. About midway we had to letdown to go under. The altitude at that point was 13, 500. From then on the weather was good and out altitude was 12,000. At this point we were joined by three B-24's.

4. We reached the enemy coast twenty-two minutes ahead of schedule. To take up this time we made a 360 degree turn and got to the target two minutes ahead of time, 1143 hours.

5. It was necessary to climb to 18,000 feet on the return just before we reached the English coast, Gomer, to escape the overcast.

6. There was no combat wing formation; groups went in individually.

7. Indicate airspeed was kept at 155 at all times and there were no excessive power settings at any time. Navigation was particularly good. The only deviation from the plan was that the top squadron peeled off over the target, made a 360 degree turn, and bombed the target alone.

OWEN D. ROANE
1st Lt. , Air Corps,
Lead Pilot

 

HEADQUARTERS
ONE HUNDREDTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H), AAF
Office of the Operations Officer
APO # 634
17 November 1943

SUBJECT:Lead Navigator's Narrative for Mission of 16 November 1943. 
TO:Commanding Officer, 100th Bombardment Group (H), Army Air Forces.

1. The 100th Group flew as a separate Unit or Task Force.

2. The group left Louth one minute after the briefed time. The rendezvous, as such, continued until the middle of the North Sea as we left the English coast with eleven ships in the formation and bombed the target with twenty-four, including two B-24s. The briefed course to the Norwegian coast and to the I. P. was parallel about 20 miles to the north. The Norwegian coast was reached 18 minutes early and as the group was briefed to bomb at 1145 hours, this time was lost by a circle and the target was bombed at 1143 hours. The weather over the target was C. A. V. U. at the time of bombing. The group encountered dangerous weather on the return which was made to Gromer rather than Louth as briefed.

3. The bomb run was made on a heading of 80 degrees mag - and the target was destroyed (apparently) by the 100th Group at 1143. The altitude was the briefed 12,000 feet indicate (9700 feet true).

4. The equipment functioned without failure in all respects.

5. The location of the compasses in many ships and the lack of a free air temperature indicator for use by the navigator are minor difficulties the navigator should correct.

JOSEPH H. PAYNE
Capt. , Air Corps
Lead Navigator

 

HEADQUARTERS
ONE HUNDREDTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H), AAF
Office of the Operations Officer
APO # 634
17 November 1943

SUBJECT:Bombardier's Narrative for Mission of 16 November 1943. 
TO:Commanding Officer, 100th Bombardment Group (H), Army Air Forces.

1. The C - 2 computer was used and the A. B. C. attachment.

2. Due to a change in flight plan caused by an early arrival, the turn at the I. P. was only approximately five degrees. The doors were opened at this point and the A. F. C. E. was turned over to the bombardier. Snow covered ground changed the aspect of the terrain but caused no serious affects on the bombing. Two groups preceded the 100th over the target but failed to bomb. These groups left prop-wash and persistent condensation trails which later interfered with the run considerably.

3. The weather was clear at the target; the surrounding area was covered with a 3 - 5/10 or more low status clouds.

4. Bomb impacts were seen, and confirmed, in the M. P. I. The Buildings were seen to blow up.

ROBERT K. PEEL
Capt. , Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier

HEADQUARTERS
3RD AIR DIVISION
APO # 634
16 November 1943.

SUBJECT:Tactical Report of Mission, RJUKAN
TO:Commanding General, VIII Bomber Command, APO # 634

1. SUMMARY OF MISSION

A. Date. 
(1) Date of Mission - 16 November 1943. 
(2) Primary Target - RJUKEN, NORWAY. 
(3) Secondary Target - OSLO, NORWAY. 
(4) Last Resort Target - None.

B. Narrative. 
(1) Planning. 
a. A force of three combat wings was required of 3rd Bomb Division for this mission. The force was to consist of the 4th Wing, with the 385th and 94th Groups flying in that order, the 45th Wing, with the 388th, 95th - B and 96th -A Groups in that order, and the 13th Wing with the 95th, 100th and 390th in that order.

b. The groups were to fly individually at one minute intervals, with the wings departing the English coast at three minute intervals.

c. VIII Bomber Command set the time and maximum altitude of groups over the target, while headquarters chose the route to and from the target. The usual considerations were taken into account in planning the route.

d. Because of the early hour of take-off, the unfavorable weather conditions forecast at take-off time, and the reasonable assumption that enemy fighter resistance would be weak, it was decided not to fly in combat wing formation but rather in individual group formations throughout the entire mission.

(2) Execution. 
a. The groups did not leave the English coast at the proper time interval because several of them experienced difficulty in assembling, due to darkness and weather conditions. However, the groups did space them selves fairly well over the North Sea.

b. The 95th - A Group failed to assemble. Aircraft from this group flew with other groups of the division.

c. The first three groups made landfall at the Norwegian coast nineteen minutes early and consequently made a large 360 degree turn which took twelve minutes. Arriving at the IP five minutes early, the 385th Group, leading the division, began another 360 turn in order to bomb the target at the proper time. The 100th Group, which was not in visual contact with the other groups up to that time, approached the IP as the lead group was making the 360 turn. This group proceeded to make a bombing run and were the first group to attack the target.

d. This section is unreadable on the record. . . pw)

e. Route out and back was as briefed for all groups.

C. Assembly. 
(1) The 96th - A Group had particular difficulty in assembling. The fourth aircraft scheduled to take-off blew a tire and blocked the perimeter. Since another part of the perimeter was unserviceable a large amount of maneuvering became necessary and the remaining aircraft in the 96th - A Group and the entire 96th - B Group took off nearly one hour late. The leader of the 96th - A Group, who was airborne at the proper time, joined another group formation with his two wing aircraft. The remainder of the 96th A Groups flew with other group formations.

(2) Several of the groups did not accomplish complete group assembly until departing the English coast.

(3) There are several instances of aircraft failing to assemble with their own group formation and flying with other groups.

D. Rendezvous with Fighters.

(1) Fighter support was not planned for this mission.

E. Bombing Tactics and Results. 
(1) All groups attacked RJUKAN.

(2) Disturbing factors encountered on the bomb run were low drifting clouds, smoke, and contrails of preceding groups. The lead group, the 385th, arrived at the IP early, and in order to avoid bombing target before zero hour made a 360 turn. Other groups instead of following the leader, went on into the target, thus changing bombing order of the groups.

(3) The 94th, 95th and 388th Groups each made two bomb runs because of smoke, clouds, and contrails, while the 390th Group made three bomb runs for the same reasons.

(4) The 390th Group changed leaders in the middle of the last bomb run because of sight malfunction of the lead ship. The Group dropped on the deputy leader.

(5) Bombing Data.

Order of Groups 100th 385th 96thA 96thB 388th 94th 95th 390th
True Altitude 9,750 9,570 10,575 9,561 10,175 9,561 9,561 9,560
Magnetic Heading

80

60

62 62 65 65 40 58
Time of Attack

1143

1144

1145 1151 1153 1155 1200 1204
Length of Run

60sec

6 ½ min

120 sec 120 sec 240 sec 360 sec 60 sec 420 sec
AFCE

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

ABC

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No. Sightings

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Dropped of Leader

19

19

19* 18* 16 19 17* 18

* Note. . Totals indicate number of aircraft of group which bombed, but do not mean the bombed on their respective lead ship. It is impossible to account for position of planes which flew with groups other than their own.

(6) A slight haze and the small scale of the photographs prevent positive determination of all bomb bursts on the hydro electric power station. Bomb concentration extend from the power station across the north wall and at least five direct hits were scored on the water electrolysis house. Work shops were also damaged and the lower of the panstocks received a direct hit. Heavy damage id visible over the entire area.

(7) The chemical works received a concentration of hits and considerable damage was done. Precise assessment is impossible because of snow blasts and some buildings being on fire. There were at least two direct hits on the absorption towers and one on the nitric acid concentration plant. These buildings were left in flames. A large number of strikes across the area destroyed the carpenter shop and seriously damaged the locomotive sheds and rolling stock repair shops. The shop for packing nitrate of lime was almost completely gutted.

F. AA Gun Fire
(1) There were no heavy AA fire in the target area but some automatic weapon fire was reported. This was not damaging. Confirming reports indicate that there were guns located on each end of the target building and on the penstock. Flashes, with no resultant bursts, were observed from three guns.

(2) Heavy AA fire was reported from many places in coastal area from Lister airdrome to Stavanger. Much of the AA fire was from ships and three planes were slightly damaged by this fire. Some Automatic weapon fire was also observed from ships. Meager inaccurate heavy gun fire was observed from Varhaug, Ana Sira, Kartevold, Hellvig, Ogne, Bjornstad, Stavenger, and Lister airdromes. In addition to the automatic weapon fire already mentioned, some of the 3rd Division aircraft that bombed Knaban reported automatic weapon fire from this target.

G. Enemy Aircraft Encountered
(1) Only five groups reported enemy aircraft, with only ten to fifteen enemy aircraft seen evenly divided between FW - 190s and ME - 109s. the attacks made were aimed as the high groups from twelve and six o'clock, both high and low. Only three enemy aircraft are reported as having pressed home their attacks, the remainder making passes at distant range. One enemy aircraft was reported by three groups as having fired small rockets or shells larger than 20 mm at the formation. There was no air to air bombing.

(2) This division lost one aircraft, cause unknown.

(3) Claims are two FW 190"s destroyed.

H. Abortives:
(1) Failed to take off.

a. 95th Group
1. A/C #42-30235 magneto failed to operate properly.

b. 96th Group
1. A/C #42-30180 IFF equipment shorted and began to burn while taxing for take-off. 
2. A/C #42-3546 tire blew out while taxing for take-off. 
3. A/C #42-31142 stuck in mud taxing around #42-3546.

c. 380th Group. 
1. A/C #42-3518 broken oil cooler.

d. 390th Group
1. A/C #42-37806 tail wheel tire blew out.

(2) Returned before crossing English Coast.

a. 94th Group. 
1. A/C #42-3185 pilot ill.

b. 95th Group
1. A/C #42-3545 gunner's hands frozen
2. A/C #42-37766 Lost formation when super charger failed. 
3. A/C #42-31123 Replacing another aircraft, could not catch formation.

c. 96th Group
1. A/C #42-3087 Received message mission scrubbed. 
2. A/C #42-30589 Unable to control prop and supercharger.

d. 385th Group
1. A/C #42-30836 Engine failure.

e. 388th Group
1. A/C #42-3295 Lost engine.

f. 390th Group
1. A/C #42-39813 abandoned by crew after fire started in nacelle. 
2. A/C #42-3427 Could not find formation. 
3. A/C #42-30713 External prop governor oil line on engine broken.

(3) Returned after crossing English Coast

a. 94th Group
1. A/C #42-39859 Bomb release failed

b. 95th Group
1. A/C #42-30218 Carburetor iced up.

c. 96th Group
1. A/C #42-30366 Took off without sufficient fuel to complete mission. 2. A/C 42-31121 Lost formation. 
3. A/C #42-6097 Bomb rack malfunction. 
4. A/C #42-30692 flew with group that failed to bomb. 
5. A/C #42-30359 Couldn't find formation.

d. 100th Group
1. A/C #42-30062 Bombardier ill, could not find formation.

e. 385th Group
1. A/C #42-31171 Lost formation and got in wrong division. 
2. A/C #42-3292 Engine rough at altitude.

f. 388th Group
1. A/C #42-3291 Could not locate formation. 
2. A/C #42-30793 Could not keep formation due to icing conditions on tail.

g. 390th Group
1. A/C #42-30266 Ball Turret Door torn off on flight. 
2. A/C #42-30233 Could not find lead formation.

(4) Other Equipment and Personnel Failures

a. The following engineering failures with the number indicated in parentheses. 1. Heating system inoperative (3); Prop overspeed (1); Tachometer out (1); Cylinder head temperature gauge inoperative (2); Tachometer fluctuates (2); Oil pressure low (1); Oxygen regulator inoperative (2); Supercharger regulator sluggish (4); Generator out (5); Throttle need synchronizing (1); Flight indicator out (2); Hydraulic pump defective (1); Broken handle on Ball Turret (1); Oil temperature fluctuates (1); Oxygen leak (3); Heated suit outlet (1); Prop failure (1); Fluxgate compass inoperative (1); Engine rough (1); Fuel quantity gauge erratic (1); Supercharger regulator out (4); Oxygen flow indicator erratic (1); Fuel pressure erratic (1); Frequency meter out (1); Carb air temperature inoperative (1); Heater out (3); Engine oscillates (2).

b. The following armament failures were reported, with the number indicated in parentheses.

1. Bombay doors would not close (3); Gun failed to fire (1); Could not depress trigger (1); Electric system failed (1); Charging lines broken (1); Headspace tight (1); Radio gun ran away (1); 2nd position stoppage (1); Bombsight stabilizer mount could not be tightened (1); Azimuth control sluggish (1); Bomb bay door rod twisted off (1); Rheostat burned out (1); Gun froze (1); Vickers unit leak (2); Heating pad jammed (1); Heater bent up to where cover would not close (1); Lost door off Ball Turret (1); Bomb Bay doors would not open properly (3); Sight out (1); Ball Turret inoperative in azimuth (1); Turret light our (1); Stations in Bomb Bay inoperative (1); Guns froze - solenoid trouble (1).

c. The following communication failures were reported, with the number of cases indicated in parentheses:

1. GEE (1); Interphone (5); Pilots microphone buttons (7); Liaison receiver (1); Liaison transmitter (1); Command receiver (1); Radio compasses (3); microphone switches (2); Jackbox (1).

I. Communication.

(1) Radio Procedure.

a. The command set was on 6440 kc/s for air to air R/T communications. VHF was on channel "A" for interplane and channel "B" for communicating between wings and the division.

(2) Radio Aids to Navigation.

a. Seven Splasher beacons, three buncher beacons, and multi-group beacons were turned on as an aid to assembling and homing.

b. Two GEE chains were turned on but the Northern Utah GEE chain was inoperative. Gee was carried by ninety-one aircraft, and the most distant fix achieved was at 5830N - 0550E. Four fixes and forty-eight QDM's were obtained in addition to the help received from the VHF D/F stations.

(3) REMARKS

a. Low clouds and icing conditions made the pre-dawn take-off and assembly on this mission very difficult. It was necessary for assembly to take place long before daylight, between layers of the overcast or on top of the overcast. Weather conditions averages 500 feet ceilings at bases. In spite of these handicaps, most of the groups completed partial assembly and departed the coast on time, although a good many aircraft failed to occupy their assigned positions in the proper group formations and some even flew with another division. Also some aircraft from both the 1st and 2nd Divisions assembled with the 3rd Division formations.

b. While pre-dawn take-offs in good weather are entirely feasible, it is believed that night take-offs in bad weather should be limited to missions of most extreme military urgency. An appreciable percentage of combat efficiency will be lost due to failure to complete assemblies and to assemble in proper order or even with the proper formation. In addition, where such take-offs requires immediate climb with heavy load, through thick overcast in heavy icing conditions, the risk of losing entire formations should be considered.

c. It is felt that the difficult requirements on this mission make the successful navigation particularly commendable.

RUSSEL A. WILSON
Colonel, Air Corps
Commanding

 

BOMBARDIERS LOG

RJUKAN

Rjukan_______________________1830 feet___________________0625_____

Target Elevation Take-off time

November 16, 1943_________________________________________________

Date Escort

_________________________________________________________________

Description and Remarks:

* Pressure Altitude of Target 1915 Ft ** Type & Size of Bombs AM - M44 1000#
* Altimeter Setting 29. 92 ** No. of Bombs Fusing, Nose 1/10 Loaded 8 Tail 1/10
* Indicated Altitude 12,000 ** Initial Point * Ordered Actual 5943 N - 0801E
* True Altitude above Target 9,750 X Length of Run X Time of Run 60 seconds 1142 hours
X Air Speed (MPH) CAS TAS 155 185 * Mag. Head. Ordered X Mag. Head Actual 80 60
* Ground Speed * Est ** Actual 185 185 X Time of Release ** No. of Bombs Released 1142 8
* Forecast X Actual Drift 6 (degrees) L 4 (degrees) L ** Type of Train Salvo Individual Release X
* Actual Range * Point of Impact (if seen) Target
* Tan. Drop Angle * Est X Actual--- . 67 ** Airplane Type No. B-17F 42-30487
X Disc Speed Trail 210. 7 29 ** Pilot Roane, O. D. 1st Lt
** Actual Time ** B. S. Type of Fall 25:00 M - 9 ** Navigator Payne, J. H. Capt.
-- ** Bombardier Peel, R. K. Capt.

Height

Wind Direction Wind Velocity Temp. Forecast Temp. Actual REMARKS:
 

* Est X Actual

* Est X Actual

*

X

 

1000

         

3000

         

6000

         

10000

         

15000

20 20

35 20

-22

-24

 

20000

         

22000

         

24000

         

26000

         

30000

         

* Fill in before take-off ** Fill in after landing X Fill in during flight

COMBAT BOMBING FLIGHT RECORD

BOMBARDIER: Robert K. Peel, Capt. __________DATE: 11-16-43____________

PILOT: O. D. Roane, 1st Lt. _TAKE-OFF 0625 (British Summer Time)

NAVIGATOR: J. H. Payne, Capt. LANDED 1513 (British Summer Time)

ORGANIZATION: 349TH Sqdn. 100th BG AIRPLANE B-17F 42-30487__

Squadron Group Type Number

OBJECTIVE: ___Rjuken-Hydro - electric and Chemical Plant_________________

AIMING POINT: Target_______________________________________________

INITIAL POINT: _5945' N & 0801' E__________________________________________________________

METHOD OF ATTACK_______________________________________X________

Individual Flight Sqdn. Group Wing

NUMBER OF PLANES IN UNIT: 24_______________________________________

NUMBER OF PLANES IN UNIT PERFORMING SIGHTING OPERATIONS: One______

TIME OF ATTACK: 1142________________TIME OF RELEASE: 1143____________

APPROXIMATE LENGTH OF STRAIGHT APPROACH: __60 Seconds____________

SYNCHRONIZATION:_____X__________________________________________

OnFast Slow

INFORMATION AT RELEASE POINT_______________________________________________________

Altitude, True Above Target __9750 Feet ________Calibrated Indicated Air Speed ____155 MPH_________

True Air Speed _____185 MPH____________Wind Direction __020 True_____________________

Wind Velocity 30 MPHTrue Heading _ 074 Degrees________________

Drift 4 L True Track ___ 070 Degrees__________________

Disc _____________ 210. 7___________________ Trail ______________39_____________________

MFT _____________ 25:00___________________ Tan. D. A. _________. 67__________________________

3rd Air Division 
Field Order No # 99 
Primary Target (Rjukan)
US LIST SB - SC V OITHE 10 O - P
FROM OITHE 152115A
TO US LIST SB - SC
PNT
BMP
ALC

SECRET 3 B. D. N. - 116 - E15 NOV 43 3RD BOMB DIVISION FIELD ORDER NO. 99.

1. A. FIGHTER SUPPORT - NONE
B. DIVERSIONS - NONE
C. FRIENDLY ACTIVITIES:
1ST BOMB DIVISION DEPARTS LOUTH AND ATTACKS TARGET SN - 50 AT ZERO HOUR. 
2ND BOMB DIVISION DEPARTS CROMER AND ATTACKS TARGET SN-23 AT ZERO HOUR.

2. A. TARGETS: ALL COMBAT WINGS:

SN - 53B IS RJUKAN

SN - 23 IS OLSO

PRIMARY - SN-53B

SECONDARY - SN - 23

LAST RESORT - NONE

B. FORCE REQUIRED:

4 C. B. W. 2 GROUPS 21 A/C PER GROUP

13. . C. B. W. 3 GROUPS 21 A/C PER GROUP

45 C. B. W. 3 GROUPS 21 A/C PER GROUP

C. ROUTES:

SPLASHER NO 4 (12,000 FEET)

58 16'N & 06 24'E

59 43'N & 08 01'E (I. P. )

D. TARGETZERO HOUR.

E. TIMES TO FOLLOW

(A) AXIS IF ATTACKSW - NE

(B) ROUTE BACK:

5948'N & 0852'E

5816'N & 0624'E

SPLASHER NO 4

I. BOMBING ALTITUDE: 12,000FT

3. A. THE 4TH COMBAT WING WILL DISPATCH INDIVIDUAL GROUPS TO LEAD THE 3RD BOMB

DIVISION.

B. THE 45TH COMBAT WING WILL DISPATCH INDIVIDUAL GROUPS TO FOLLOW THE 4TH COMBAT WING AT A THREE MINUTE INTERVAL.

C. THE 13TH COMBAT WING WILL DISPATCH INDIVIDUAL GROUPS TO FOLLOW THE 45 COMBAT WING AT A THREE MINUTE INTERVAL.

(1) ZERO HOUR:1145 B. S. T. 16 NOVEMBER 1943

(2) BOMB LOAD: ALL GROUPS; 5 X 1000 LB G. P. 1/10 SEC NOSE 1/10 SEC TAIL

VISUAL CONDITIONS ARE FORECAST AT TARGET, HOWEVER IT IS NECESSARY TO CLIMB ABOVE 12,000 FEET OVER NORTH SEA DESCENDING TO BOMBING ALTITUDE PRIOR TO REACHING INITIAL POINT. THE PROCEDURE WILL ALSO

HOLD FOR ROUTE BACK.

SQUADRONS THAT FAIL TO RENDEZVOUS WITH THEIR GROUPS WILL PROCEED ON

THEIR OWN.

(5) FULL FUEL LOAD WILL BE CARRIED.

(6) GROUPS WILL DEPART LOUTH AT 12,000 FEET OR ON TOP OF OVERCAST.

LEAD GROUPS OF 45TH AND 13TH COMBAT WINGS WILL DEPART LOUTH THREE

MINUTES AFTER LEAD GROUPS OF PROCEEDING COMBAT WING.

(8) GROUPS WILL NOT LOSE 1,000 FEET AFTER BOMBING.

4. NORMAL: COMBAT WINGS WILL FORWARD COPIES OF RESPECTIVE FIELD ORDERS TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.

5. A. SPLASHER BEACONS ON DURING ENTIRE MISSION.

4D, 5E, 6F, 7G, 8H, 9I, AND 11J.

B. "GEE" INFORMATION:

NORMAL TRANSMISSIONS: EASTERN WYOMING AND NORTHERN UTAH CHAINS ON GRADE "A"OPERATION DURING ENTIRE MISSION.

XF TRANSMISSIONS: NONE
C. MF D/F SECTION "G"
D. CALL SIGNS: NORMAL
E. VHF: NORMAL
F. CALL SIGN BRANFF TOWER "SHORTLEG", MF D/F "SU 7" 5405 KC/S.

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX TO 3RD BOMB DIVISION FIELD ORDER NO #99

THE IMPORTANCE TO THE TARGET IS DUE TO THE HEAVY WATER WHICH IT MAKES. THIS WATER IS USED IN MAKING A TYPE OF EXPLOSIVE TO WHICH THE ENEMY ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE. GROUND SOURCES INDICATE THERE IS A 10,000 GALLON CAPACITY HYDROGEN OR HEAVY WATER TANK IN THE BASEMENT OF BUILDING NUMBER 16 ON ILLUSTRATION /9, AND WHICH IF HIT WILL PROBABLY DESTROY THE ENTIRE PLANT.

Bowman Diary - Page 04