Mission Date: July 26, 1943
HANOVER, RUBBER WORKS (BMB CONVOY)
100th BG Mission #: 10
Mission Summary
Continuing VIII Bomber Command’s campaign in targeting Hamburg under the code name ‘Operation Gomorrah,’ the 8th Air Force would send its 1st Division forces on a second daylight raid to Hamburg where the six bombardment groups attacking the previous day would be sent again. The 4th Bombardment Wing’s forces would be sent to Hanover to attack the Continental Gummiwerke A.G, the largest tire factory in Germany.
Orders received at Thorpe Abbotts would call for twenty-three aircraft and crews to be put up by the 100BG, including a spare. In the early hours of the morning as the heavy bombers were readied by ordnance and the specific B-17s and crew names identified on the squadron boards, the various airmen were being awakened across all four of the squadron areas.
After being checking in at the briefing door and subsequent briefing commencement, the men learned that their primary target for the day would be the Continental Rubber Company located near the center of Hanover (Hannover). The last resort targets were identified as “any industrial target of opportunity in this area.”
The 4CBW was scheduled to be led by the 401st CBW, with the 96BG, 385BG and 94BG flying in that order. The 402nd CBW, flying behind the 401st, would be led by the 100BG, under the command of Colonel Chick Harding who would fly that morning with Mark Carnell’s crew and assigned to the B-17 named ‘Sweater Girl.” The 388BG and 95BG were scheduled to fly behind the 100th.
As the S-2 Intelligence Officer pointed to route markings across the map, he explained to the men seated that both routes and times had been designated by VIII Bomber Command so as to coordinate with the 1st Air Division’s forces as both forces were planned be in the target area simultaneously in order to aid in the dispersement of any expected attacking enemy fighters.
As the IP and turn onto the bomb run were further identified on the map, the men took note of the designated and longer than usual bomb run, which had been planned to avoid as much of the anti-aircraft fire as possible on the run into the target and to allow a turn-out toward the North Sea again immediately after bombs were away.
Taking off by 0800 hours, the present clouds made assembly difficult and records tell us “Yet again, clouds and overcast had hampered assembly, despite the recent introduction of ‘Splasher Beacons’…As a result, our six groups left the English coast in one large formation and never attained their assigned positions.”
Over the Frisian Islands there were problems maintaining formations and their proper positions. The mission had no friendly escorts planned and Harding found his 100BG about to go into Germany alone. The 100th’s bomber force had already been reduced by six aborts and with only sixteen of its bombers left in the formation, Harding decided to head the 100th’s formation back to England.
Sighting an enemy convoy off the German coast as a Target of Opportunity, the 100BG’s formation dropped its bombs on the convoy at 11:15 hours from 20500 feet with a reported direct hit. With no friendly escorts or other groups providing cover, the 100BG was attacked by a total of fifteen enemy aircraft 12 ME 109s, 2 ME110s and one JU88. Air to air bombing was reported as well as the ME110’s firing from 37MM cannons mounted on the right wing. But the 100th’s gunners were on the ball and although the ships returned with battle damage, all bombers returned safely to base.
Meanwhile, the 96BG, 388BG and 95BGs which were flying in that order, finally got into a combat wing formation and continued on the planned route, and bombed the primary target at Hannover. They had it rougher when they encountered close to 100 enemy fighters made up of FW 190s, ME109s, ME110s, ME210s and a few HE 113s.
The 385BG and 94BGs would end up flying together, but attacking different targets of opportunity; the 385th bombing Wesermunde and the 94BG bombing Wilhelshaven.
That evening, Red Bowman recorded into his diary, “…Owing to confusion over the Friesian Islands, the rendezvous was not effected and the whole Group was forced to abort – or go into Germany alone – not a wise procedure. Some ships took out their disappointment on a enemy convey encountered on the way home – reported a direct hit on a merchant vessel. Colonel Harding led and was not happy…”
It would not be a good day overall for the 4th Bombardment Wing. Out of its six groups sent out that morning, only the 100BG returned with no aircraft lost and one wounded airman while the remaining groups in total would lose sixteen bombers and over 206 airmen.
Colonel LeMay would leave us with his summary remarks as noted on the mission critique. He said: “The targets of opportunity chosen by some of the groups on this mission were the best available in view of weather conditions and the large number of fighters attacking our formations. Units of this command are continuing to make careful preparation to meet contingencies which call for the choice of a target other than the one assigned. Bombardiers and navigators are studying all important targets until they are able to recognize the correct aiming point even under conditions of smoke, camouflage and haze.
The difficulties inherent in flying large formations require the constant, untiring attention of each group leader. This is true at all times, but particularly so when weather conditions are unfavorable. It is then that the ability of the leaders is taxed to the limit. Group Commanders therefore have been instructed to choose their most capable and experienced men as leaders.
It is recommended that, if possible, night attacks should not precede daylight attacks on the same targets. When this happens, the smoke from the night attack often obscures or partially obscures the target the next day and accurate sighting impossible or extremely difficult.” Curtis E. Le May, Colonel, Air Corps Commanding
For the 100BG in the lead formation, it would see four of its bombers abort the mission: Bastard’s Bungalow returned with its command and liaison radio sets inoperative, flight indicator and electrical hydraulic pump inoperative and a short in the #4 engine. Badger Beauty returned early due to a gas leak in the left wing. Mad House returned due to failure of a supercharger at 23000 feet and finally, Thomas Hummel returned his B-17 early to base due to the sickness of his Flight Engineer.
Crews known to fly this mission:
349th - Fuller/MacCarter, Reed, Roane, Hennington, Justice
350th - Carnell, Hollenbeck, Braley, Helstrom, Hummel
351 - Pearson, Fienup, Murphy, Barker, Dye,
418 - Cruikshank, Brady, Woodward, Knox, Moreno
Orders received at Thorpe Abbotts would call for twenty-three aircraft and crews to be put up by the 100BG, including a spare. In the early hours of the morning as the heavy bombers were readied by ordnance and the specific B-17s and crew names identified on the squadron boards, the various airmen were being awakened across all four of the squadron areas.
After being checking in at the briefing door and subsequent briefing commencement, the men learned that their primary target for the day would be the Continental Rubber Company located near the center of Hanover (Hannover). The last resort targets were identified as “any industrial target of opportunity in this area.”
The 4CBW was scheduled to be led by the 401st CBW, with the 96BG, 385BG and 94BG flying in that order. The 402nd CBW, flying behind the 401st, would be led by the 100BG, under the command of Colonel Chick Harding who would fly that morning with Mark Carnell’s crew and assigned to the B-17 named ‘Sweater Girl.” The 388BG and 95BG were scheduled to fly behind the 100th.
As the S-2 Intelligence Officer pointed to route markings across the map, he explained to the men seated that both routes and times had been designated by VIII Bomber Command so as to coordinate with the 1st Air Division’s forces as both forces were planned be in the target area simultaneously in order to aid in the dispersement of any expected attacking enemy fighters.
As the IP and turn onto the bomb run were further identified on the map, the men took note of the designated and longer than usual bomb run, which had been planned to avoid as much of the anti-aircraft fire as possible on the run into the target and to allow a turn-out toward the North Sea again immediately after bombs were away.
Taking off by 0800 hours, the present clouds made assembly difficult and records tell us “Yet again, clouds and overcast had hampered assembly, despite the recent introduction of ‘Splasher Beacons’…As a result, our six groups left the English coast in one large formation and never attained their assigned positions.”
Over the Frisian Islands there were problems maintaining formations and their proper positions. The mission had no friendly escorts planned and Harding found his 100BG about to go into Germany alone. The 100th’s bomber force had already been reduced by six aborts and with only sixteen of its bombers left in the formation, Harding decided to head the 100th’s formation back to England.
Sighting an enemy convoy off the German coast as a Target of Opportunity, the 100BG’s formation dropped its bombs on the convoy at 11:15 hours from 20500 feet with a reported direct hit. With no friendly escorts or other groups providing cover, the 100BG was attacked by a total of fifteen enemy aircraft 12 ME 109s, 2 ME110s and one JU88. Air to air bombing was reported as well as the ME110’s firing from 37MM cannons mounted on the right wing. But the 100th’s gunners were on the ball and although the ships returned with battle damage, all bombers returned safely to base.
Meanwhile, the 96BG, 388BG and 95BGs which were flying in that order, finally got into a combat wing formation and continued on the planned route, and bombed the primary target at Hannover. They had it rougher when they encountered close to 100 enemy fighters made up of FW 190s, ME109s, ME110s, ME210s and a few HE 113s.
The 385BG and 94BGs would end up flying together, but attacking different targets of opportunity; the 385th bombing Wesermunde and the 94BG bombing Wilhelshaven.
That evening, Red Bowman recorded into his diary, “…Owing to confusion over the Friesian Islands, the rendezvous was not effected and the whole Group was forced to abort – or go into Germany alone – not a wise procedure. Some ships took out their disappointment on a enemy convey encountered on the way home – reported a direct hit on a merchant vessel. Colonel Harding led and was not happy…”
It would not be a good day overall for the 4th Bombardment Wing. Out of its six groups sent out that morning, only the 100BG returned with no aircraft lost and one wounded airman while the remaining groups in total would lose sixteen bombers and over 206 airmen.
Colonel LeMay would leave us with his summary remarks as noted on the mission critique. He said: “The targets of opportunity chosen by some of the groups on this mission were the best available in view of weather conditions and the large number of fighters attacking our formations. Units of this command are continuing to make careful preparation to meet contingencies which call for the choice of a target other than the one assigned. Bombardiers and navigators are studying all important targets until they are able to recognize the correct aiming point even under conditions of smoke, camouflage and haze.
The difficulties inherent in flying large formations require the constant, untiring attention of each group leader. This is true at all times, but particularly so when weather conditions are unfavorable. It is then that the ability of the leaders is taxed to the limit. Group Commanders therefore have been instructed to choose their most capable and experienced men as leaders.
It is recommended that, if possible, night attacks should not precede daylight attacks on the same targets. When this happens, the smoke from the night attack often obscures or partially obscures the target the next day and accurate sighting impossible or extremely difficult.” Curtis E. Le May, Colonel, Air Corps Commanding
For the 100BG in the lead formation, it would see four of its bombers abort the mission: Bastard’s Bungalow returned with its command and liaison radio sets inoperative, flight indicator and electrical hydraulic pump inoperative and a short in the #4 engine. Badger Beauty returned early due to a gas leak in the left wing. Mad House returned due to failure of a supercharger at 23000 feet and finally, Thomas Hummel returned his B-17 early to base due to the sickness of his Flight Engineer.
Crews known to fly this mission:
349th - Fuller/MacCarter, Reed, Roane, Hennington, Justice
350th - Carnell, Hollenbeck, Braley, Helstrom, Hummel
351 - Pearson, Fienup, Murphy, Barker, Dye,
418 - Cruikshank, Brady, Woodward, Knox, Moreno
Bombing Results
Bombing Results: CONVOY
Aircraft Lost: 0
Crew Lost: 0
Claims of Enemy Losses (CLS): 0
Aircraft Returned:
