Mission Date: August 19, 1943
WOENSDRECHT, AF (HOLLAND)
100th BG Mission #: 17
Mission Summary
ON THIS DAY...
With little heard of the Regensburg mission back at Thorpe Abbotts, Red Bowman, head of Intelligence recorded, “No news directly from our Combat Crews. Bomber Command has word from Colonel Curtis LeMay, who led mission, that the target was destroyed - we know that the boys got to the target and LeMay’s plane at least reached North Africa. Rumor that 115 Fortresses were safely on the ground, seven in the Mediterranean Sea and two on Switzerland…”
Less than a dozen crews remained back at Thorpe Abbotts. At 0750 on August 19, the 100th Bomb Group was alerted for another mission. The official Field Order #42 followed at 1220 hours. Seven crews were scheduled to fly that day and at 1300 hours, the crews of MacCarter, Reeder, Helstrom, Floyd, Turner, Dye, King, and Swartout checked in for the afternoon briefing.
The primary target was divulged as the Luftwaffe airdrome located at Woensdrecht, Holland from where ME-109s and FW 190s were deployed. The secondary target would be the airdrome at Gilze-Rijen, 43 miles further east.
Two composite groups would be flying with the 403rd and 401st wings forming the first group while the 402nd wing would supply the second composite group. The 100BG would lead the second composite group, with the 95BG forming the low and the 390BG forming the high squadron.
The leader of the 100BG tells us, “We took off at 1630 hours to rendezvous with the 390th at 2000 feet over the field. We were a little slow in climbing to our altitude. We arrived at Splasher #6 on time. Reached the Air Division Assembly line a little late. The other Groups had already reached their altitude and we had 2000 or 3000 feet to go. We were three and one-half minutes late leaving the English coast and two minutes late at the coast near Ostende…”
At 1810, the formation departed the English coast at Felixstowe. Friendly fighter support was reported first observed at 1820 over the English Coast and last observed at 1855, with P-47s maintaining good cover. Anti-aircraft fire was encountered near Ostende and at Nieuwe-Sluis, reported as “moderate in intensity and accurate as to height and course, especially from Ostend.”
Records tell us that the 10/10 clouds from the coast to the IP “made it impossible to know the exact position of the AC. In the vicinity of the IP, the cloud changed to broken, but a heavy mist or haze produced extremely low visibility below the cloud level in the target area.”
With the primary target covered, the formations continued to the secondary. In the Gilze-Rejin area, continuous following fire was quite accurate and moderate in intensity. At 1908 hours in the vicinity of Roosendaal, approximately ten to twelve FW 190s and ME-109s began an attack on the formation that lasted about fifteen minutes and were considered “half-hearted” attacks.
Although all of the aircraft had opened their bomb bay doors for the bomb run, the visibility had been in question over both the primary and secondary targets. The crews had been warned to not execute any indiscriminate bombing, so the bomb doors were closed and the course set for home with no bombs dropped. The 100th’s lead Navigator reported, “My ball turret man called to say an airport was under us but we had already turned to go back so it was too late to do anything about it.”
At the rendezvous point, the first composite group struggled to get into any type of defensive formation, coming home in a column of planes while the second group made up of the 100BG, 95BG and 390BG maintained its group formation on the route home, with all of the 100th’s aircraft returning safely to Thorpe Abbotts.
Although the crews were disappointed in returning with no bombing credit, spirits during interrogation were buoyed when photos from the Regensburg mission came in. Red Bowman recorded, “Today our seven remaining crews took off to raid Dutch airports. Interrogation was interrupted to show crews photos, just received, of what the boys did at Regensburg – it was blasted to Hell and Gone. ME assembly plant in shambles – about a square mile of ruins. Photos show the Red Cross Hospital on the edge of the target area untouched – testifying to the accuracy of our bombing. The 100th MPI (Mean Point of Impact) obliterated. If our crews return safely it will have been a great mission for us - any case will go down as one of the great air exploits of the war.”
In the mission review held the next day, Divisional leader Colonel Wilson had strong words for all of the Group leaders about their defensive formation flying, stating, “… A defensive formation is for defense against fighter attack. It does no good to fly that way across England and then break up over enemy territory. We can't blame the new crews. We just decided to give up. The fighter cover we had was up there but it didn't interfere with a reasonable number of enemy planes that attacked us. This was a short mission and I don’t think it would have seriously tired anyone to have stayed in formation…I thought it was a good idea to run new crews on these missions but if they have this idea about spreading all over the sky because of friendly fighter support, we had better start them on a raid to Bremen or Berlin. Today was the poorest defensive formation I ever saw. We have been blaming the formation of composite units for our poor formation. After the formation of yesterday, that argument will carry no weight with me. The fact that we were flying composite Groups is no excuse for the fact that the six plane squadrons did not stay together…”
Crews flying: MacCarter in Damifino, Reeder in Squawkin’ Hawk, Helstrom in Sans Finis, Floyd in Torchy, Dye in Sunny, King in Janie, Swartout in Skipper, Cruickshank, Turner
With little heard of the Regensburg mission back at Thorpe Abbotts, Red Bowman, head of Intelligence recorded, “No news directly from our Combat Crews. Bomber Command has word from Colonel Curtis LeMay, who led mission, that the target was destroyed - we know that the boys got to the target and LeMay’s plane at least reached North Africa. Rumor that 115 Fortresses were safely on the ground, seven in the Mediterranean Sea and two on Switzerland…”
Less than a dozen crews remained back at Thorpe Abbotts. At 0750 on August 19, the 100th Bomb Group was alerted for another mission. The official Field Order #42 followed at 1220 hours. Seven crews were scheduled to fly that day and at 1300 hours, the crews of MacCarter, Reeder, Helstrom, Floyd, Turner, Dye, King, and Swartout checked in for the afternoon briefing.
The primary target was divulged as the Luftwaffe airdrome located at Woensdrecht, Holland from where ME-109s and FW 190s were deployed. The secondary target would be the airdrome at Gilze-Rijen, 43 miles further east.
Two composite groups would be flying with the 403rd and 401st wings forming the first group while the 402nd wing would supply the second composite group. The 100BG would lead the second composite group, with the 95BG forming the low and the 390BG forming the high squadron.
The leader of the 100BG tells us, “We took off at 1630 hours to rendezvous with the 390th at 2000 feet over the field. We were a little slow in climbing to our altitude. We arrived at Splasher #6 on time. Reached the Air Division Assembly line a little late. The other Groups had already reached their altitude and we had 2000 or 3000 feet to go. We were three and one-half minutes late leaving the English coast and two minutes late at the coast near Ostende…”
At 1810, the formation departed the English coast at Felixstowe. Friendly fighter support was reported first observed at 1820 over the English Coast and last observed at 1855, with P-47s maintaining good cover. Anti-aircraft fire was encountered near Ostende and at Nieuwe-Sluis, reported as “moderate in intensity and accurate as to height and course, especially from Ostend.”
Records tell us that the 10/10 clouds from the coast to the IP “made it impossible to know the exact position of the AC. In the vicinity of the IP, the cloud changed to broken, but a heavy mist or haze produced extremely low visibility below the cloud level in the target area.”
With the primary target covered, the formations continued to the secondary. In the Gilze-Rejin area, continuous following fire was quite accurate and moderate in intensity. At 1908 hours in the vicinity of Roosendaal, approximately ten to twelve FW 190s and ME-109s began an attack on the formation that lasted about fifteen minutes and were considered “half-hearted” attacks.
Although all of the aircraft had opened their bomb bay doors for the bomb run, the visibility had been in question over both the primary and secondary targets. The crews had been warned to not execute any indiscriminate bombing, so the bomb doors were closed and the course set for home with no bombs dropped. The 100th’s lead Navigator reported, “My ball turret man called to say an airport was under us but we had already turned to go back so it was too late to do anything about it.”
At the rendezvous point, the first composite group struggled to get into any type of defensive formation, coming home in a column of planes while the second group made up of the 100BG, 95BG and 390BG maintained its group formation on the route home, with all of the 100th’s aircraft returning safely to Thorpe Abbotts.
Although the crews were disappointed in returning with no bombing credit, spirits during interrogation were buoyed when photos from the Regensburg mission came in. Red Bowman recorded, “Today our seven remaining crews took off to raid Dutch airports. Interrogation was interrupted to show crews photos, just received, of what the boys did at Regensburg – it was blasted to Hell and Gone. ME assembly plant in shambles – about a square mile of ruins. Photos show the Red Cross Hospital on the edge of the target area untouched – testifying to the accuracy of our bombing. The 100th MPI (Mean Point of Impact) obliterated. If our crews return safely it will have been a great mission for us - any case will go down as one of the great air exploits of the war.”
In the mission review held the next day, Divisional leader Colonel Wilson had strong words for all of the Group leaders about their defensive formation flying, stating, “… A defensive formation is for defense against fighter attack. It does no good to fly that way across England and then break up over enemy territory. We can't blame the new crews. We just decided to give up. The fighter cover we had was up there but it didn't interfere with a reasonable number of enemy planes that attacked us. This was a short mission and I don’t think it would have seriously tired anyone to have stayed in formation…I thought it was a good idea to run new crews on these missions but if they have this idea about spreading all over the sky because of friendly fighter support, we had better start them on a raid to Bremen or Berlin. Today was the poorest defensive formation I ever saw. We have been blaming the formation of composite units for our poor formation. After the formation of yesterday, that argument will carry no weight with me. The fact that we were flying composite Groups is no excuse for the fact that the six plane squadrons did not stay together…”
Crews flying: MacCarter in Damifino, Reeder in Squawkin’ Hawk, Helstrom in Sans Finis, Floyd in Torchy, Dye in Sunny, King in Janie, Swartout in Skipper, Cruickshank, Turner
Bombing Results
Bombing Results:
Aircraft Lost: 0
Crew Lost: 0
Claims of Enemy Losses (CLS): 0
Aircraft Returned:
