

Accident No. 43-12-2344

Date

Errors which change the meaning of the McBee Card

Analyzed by

MD 2 11-43

Typed by

Coded by

Punched by

Verified by

W-7409, A.F.

Evansston, Wyoming

09:20

43-12-23-14

Take off was made
at 00:20 with 1700
gallons of gas aboard.
Pilot was warned of
a light frontal activity.
after climbing into the
overcast, he attempted to
get on top but found
it higher than what
was anticipated. Due to
static his radio became
ineffective. He flew around
the vicinity of Wendover
until around 06:00, during
which time he was
under actual instrument
conditions. He then
proceeded toward Salt
Lake, finding an opening
at Evansston, Wyoming. He
then made a wheels up

landing in an open
field.

WAR DEPARTMENT
U. S. ARMY AIR FORCES
REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

23
12/23/42
131231K

(1) Place Handover Field, Utah (2) Date 12/23/42 (3) Time 0920
AIRCRAFT: (4) Type and model B-17 (5) A. P. No. 42-5291 (6) Station Handover Field
Organized (7) 2nd AF (8) 100th B. G. (9) 118th B.

PERSONNEL									
NO.	NAME (Last, first, middle)	RANK	SERIAL NO.	BRANCH	GRADE	STATUS	AIR FORCE OR ARMY	REMARKS	USE OF EXPLANATION
(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)
1	John Donnelly Brady	P	0-733857	2nd Lt.	2C	01	AC	2 AF	Major injury None
2	Joseph Frances Faleco	P	0-733857	2nd Lt.	2C	01	AC	2 AF	"
3	H. H. Crenshaw	P	0-733857	2nd Lt.	2C	01	AC	2 AF	"
4	H. D. Hamilton	P	0-733857	2nd Lt.	2C	01	AC	2 AF	"
5	Ernest Bonchalelli	P	0-733857	2nd Lt.	2C	01	AC	2 AF	"
6	Adolph Blum	P	0-733857	2nd Lt.	2C	01	AC	2 AF	"
7	R. D. Sawyer	P	0-733857	2nd Lt.	2C	01	AC	2 AF	"
8	G. R. Petrochala	P	0-733857	2nd Lt.	2C	01	AC	2 AF	"

PILOT CHARGED WITH ACCIDENT
(20) Brady (Last name) John (First name) D (Middle initial) (21) 0-733857 (Serial number) (22) 2nd Lt. (Rank) (23) 2C (Personal class) (24) AC (Branch)
Assigned (25) 2 AF (Command and Air Force) (26) 100 (Group) (27) 118 (Squadron) (28) Handover Field, Utah (Station)
Attached for flying (29) not applicable (30) not applicable (31) not applicable (32) not applicable
Original rating (33) AP (Rating) (34) 8/5/42 (Date) Present rating (35) AP (Rating) (36) 12/23/42 (Date) Instrument rating (37) 12/21/42 (Date)
First Pilot Hours:
(38) This type 15:120 (39) This model 70:40 (40) Last 90 days 70:40 (41) Total 138:23
(42) Instrument time last 6 months 40:25 792
(43) Instrument time last 30 days 10:45 792
(44) Night time last 6 months 50:10 792
(45) Night time last 30 days 40:40 792

AIRCRAFT DAMAGE
(46) Aircraft Major Damage (47) Engine(s) Change Change Change Change (48) Propeller(s) " " " "
(49) Weather at the time of accident See attached statement 99
(50) Was the pilot flying on instruments at the time of accident No
(51) Cleared from Local (52) Kind of clearance Local
(53) Pilot's position Local heading, inst., high alt. 01
(54) Nature of accident Forced landing - wheels up (intentional.)
(55) Cause of accident Emergency landing due to weather and uncertainty of position.

On December 23, 1942, B-17-F, Aircraft Serial No. 42-5291

took off from Wendover Field on a local training flight (high bombing, actual instrument flying, and at high altitude) at 0020, with 1700

gallons of gasoline aboard. Light frontal activity was anticipated and the pilot was warned of this. The pilot slipped into the overcast and attempted to get on top. Thickness was greater than the pilot had anticipated. After this climb, his radio became ineffective, due to the static. The pilot had been assigned Las Vegas as an alternate airport,

prior to flight, and was informed that the weather was clear to the south. He attempted to fly to Las Vegas but encountered turbulence to

the south-east near Delta, returned to the vicinity of Wendover and

flew around in that vicinity from approximately 0230 to 0600 during

which time he was under actual instrument conditions and had to remain

at high altitude because of mountainous terrain. He then proceeded

toward Salt Lake. During the entire time, he had been unable to make

radio contact with the ground to secure weather or instructions. He

attempted to orient himself on the Salt Lake beam until approximately

0900 when he spotted a hole in the overcast, descended, and made an

intentional wheels-up landing in an open field. At this time, his

gasoline supply was practically exhausted. There were no injuries to

personnel and no damage to private property.

RECEIVED
NO. 111 DIRECTOR
OF FLYING SAFETY



FEB 8 1943

David H. Alkin
Col. Darr H. Alkin

Maurice A. Preston
Lt. Col. Maurice A. Preston

Robert H. Warren
Lt. Col. Robert H. Warren

Charles A. Tolansky, Jr.
Maj. Robert H. Warren

Charles A. Tolansky, Jr.
Capt. Charles A. Tolansky, Jr.

Walter T. Hall
1st Lt. Walter T. Hall

(FINDINGS APPEAR ON ATTACHED SHEET)

FINDINGS

During the course of the investigation, the following pertinent facts were developed:

1. Weather conditions were more severe than forecast. Front, instead of passing in two hours, hung in Wendover Area, with lower ceilings and visibility than anticipated.
2. Pilot error:
 - (a) Pilot did not personally check the weather.
 - (b) Pilot did not read forecast, but left this to the co-pilot who did it in a careless fashion.
 - (c) Pilot remained in local area for excessively long time before attempting to find good weather area.
3. Supervision and briefing:
 - (a) Weather forecast was not read at briefing period.
 - (b) Only one alternate base was assigned. General area "south" was designated as good weather area.
 - (c) Mission was scheduled in known-front and pilot instructed to enter weather.
 - (d) Briefing officer did not mention south west good weather area.
 - (e) Pilot was not given definite emergency procedure to be followed in case of more severe weather than expected.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACCIDENT

Weather forecast	—	20%
Pilot error	—	40%
Supervisory personnel	—	40%

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR BASE

Wendover Field, Utah.
January 1, 1943.

Special Order)
No.....1)

E X T R A C T
* * * * *

3. Under the provisions of AAF., Regulations 62-14, May 26, 1942, and Par 5, AR 95-120, the following named Officers are appointed members of the Wendover Air Base Aircraft Accident Committee.

DETAIL OF THE BOARD

COLONEL DARR H. ALKIRE	016639	AC
LT. COL ROBERT N. DIPPY	0481958	AC
LT. COL MAURICE A. PRESTON	020673	AC
MAJOR ROBERT W. WARREN	022989	AC
CAPT. CHARLES A. POLANSKY JR.	0397798	AC
1ST LT. WALTER T. WALL	0902782	AC

* * * * *

By Order of LT COLONEL DIPPY:

CHARLES A. GRACE,
CAPTAIN, Air Corps,
Actg. Adjutant.

OFFICIAL:

Charles A. Grace

CHARLES A. GRACE,
CAPTAIN, Air Corps,
Actg. Adjutant.

HEADQUARTERS
ONE HUNDREDTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H), ARMY AIR FORCES
Office of the Operations Officer


DHA/akf

Sioux City, Iowa,
February 1, 1943.

C E R T I F I C A T E

Captain JOHN C. EGAN, Air Corps, was properly qualified by experience and as Group Operations Officer to serve as Night Control Officer at the time of the accident.

His service is as follows: 2 years and two months commissioned service, total flying time one thousand six hundred and forty-three hours.



DARR H. ALKIRE,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.

CERTIFICATE

January 7, 1943

**The Engineering Officer's report on the subject: accident,
is not available at this time. It will be forwarded
immediately on receipt of same from the Ogden Air Depot,
Hill Field, Utah.**

For the President of the Board:

S. M. Persons.
**S. M. PERSONS
Major, Air Corps
Executive Officer**

STATEMENT OF ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION COMMITTEE


1. Lack of supervision on the part of the commanding personnel was found to be a contributory factor as indicated on the Form 14.

2. Inexperienced and untrained personnel necessarily employed in the responsible positions are the factors controlling the failure of proper supervision that resulted in this accident.

1st Ind.

Headquarters 15th Bombardment Wing, Army Air Base, Sioux City, Iowa,
January 15, 1943. TO: Commanding General, Second Air Force, Fort George
Wright, Washington.

I concur in the findings of the accident committee.


ROBERT F. TRAVIS
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.

1 Inc: n/c

HEADQUARTERS
ONE HUNDREDTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) ARMY AIR FORCES
Office of the Operations Officer
Wendover Field, Utah

December 29, 1942

SUBJECT: Emergency Landing of B-17F, No. 42-5291, December 24, 1942.

TO : Commanding Officer
100th Bombardment Group (H)
Wendover Field, Utah

The weather forecast at take-off time (00:20, December 24) reported an overcast of some two thousand feet in thickness, eight to ten thousand feet above the field. The condition was described to me as local and temporary and was expected to be dissipated two or three hours after take-off time. Alternate flying area was given as southern Utah and Nevada.

I took off to bomb PT-5 from 10,000 feet or as close to that altitude as possible. Finding the ceiling 7,000 feet and suspecting that there were several mountains in the vicinity of the target higher than that, I decided to climb through the overcast and fly south to check the weather.

I climbed on course toward Delta to 18,000 feet and still did not break through. Still thinking it a temporary condition, I dropped back to 17,000 and continued to Delta, ~~about~~ fifty or sixty miles farther south.

In this area I encountered extreme frontal activity, turbulence, snow and icing. This fact plus the fact that the overcast was at least 15,000 feet thick instead of the reported 2,000, aroused doubt in my mind as to the accuracy of the balance of the weather report.

I returned to the Wendover area, still at 14,000 feet and decided to fly the radio range until such time as I could drop down and complete my bombing mission.

From approximately 0230 until 0600 I flew in the immediate vicinity of Wendover. The radio compass could not be used for homing, and reception on the command set was so erratic that I was only able to determine my approximate position, so I did not attempt a let down. Several times I was able to bracket in very close to the station, only to have the radio black-out completely for a period of five to ten minutes and then have to orient myself all over again. During this time I found the loop antenna no more effective than the command antenna.

At approximately 0600 I was in the process of re-orienting myself when I switched to the Wendover range the radio compass receiver and had the co-pilot tune in Salt Lake range on the command set and attempt to contact them to obtain a weather report (our attempt to contact Wendover had been futile).

I flew for a while for an undetermined length of time, paying more attention to the co-pilot's attempts to contact Salt Lake than to what I was doing. When I did remember the automatic volume control on the radio compass, I thought we had gone too far from Wendover to take a chance on returning.

We continued our attempts to obtain weather information and also climbed to 17,000 feet where we broke through the overcast. Radio reception at this time was so poor that I was unable to orient myself on the Salt Lake range.

Between 0800 and 0830 I feathered No. 2 engine and transferred the fuel to the outboards, had the engineer inform the crew that we might have to abandon the ship and to put on their chutes, checked emergency rations, medical kits and ~~very~~ pistol and cartridges, salvaged the ten bombs (safe) and planned how we might re-assemble in the event that jumping became necessary.

During that time the co-pilot had been flying and trying to get as close as possible to a range leg since the terrain would probably not be as rough as that we thought was below.

At 0900 or very shortly after we spotted the first hole in the overcast and could see a road. We went down through immediately and found the ceiling to be between 1500 to 2,000 feet in the valley but the weather seemed to be on the ground all around us.

At the time of the break through, the navigator gave me the result of a fix which I had asked for a little before and it determined our position as over Evanston, Wyoming. We circled the area at about 800 feet, spotted a long field that looked smooth, cut the fuel on the approach and landed on the belly.

During the night I cruised at 1750 r.p.m., 27" M.P., auto-lean. At about 0600 I reduced r.p.m. to 1600, M.P. to 25" and remained in auto-lean.

Iceing both carburetor and wing was constant all night (not extreme).

After landing, we checked for injuries and found none to any of the personnel. Leaving the rest of the crew with the ship, the co-pilot and I secured a ride into the village and communicated with the Group Operations Officer and later with Colonel Alkire.

While waiting for the phone call, I contacted the owner of the field we landed in and secured his signature on a waiver of property damage.

After speaking to Colonel Alkire, I went to the Evanston National Bank and drew twenty dollars on my signature, then returned to the ship.


The bombardier had made arrangements to deposit the sight and accompanying equipment in the County Treasurer's vault, so I sent all of the crew into the town with him to eat and secure lodging for the night.

I remained with the ship during the afternoon and obtained guards through the Sheriff's office to assist. During the afternoon two authorized men from Ogden arrived and I assigned the confidential equipment over to them.

The following day I made a complete inventory of the contents of the ship and awaited arrival of the wrecking crew from Ogden. When they did arrive (1700) the gentleman in charge was not with them so I could not turn the ship over to them.

The man in charge did appear on the morning of the 26th and I secured his signature on the inventory.

While in Evanston, it was necessary to draw sixty dollars in cash and sign for approximately thirty dollars in meals.


J. D. BRADY
2nd Lt., Air Corps

TESTIMONY OF LT. STOVER

(Squadron Flight Surgeon)

Q. You are the flight surgeon for what squadron?

A. The 418th, Sir.

Q. Did you brief the crew?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In your own words, will you tell what you did?

A. The following named men were examined visably and asked as to how much sleep each had obtained in the last twenty-four hours:

2nd Lt. J. D. Brady, Pilot
2nd Lt. J. S. Felece, Co-Pilot
2nd Lt. H. H. Crosby, Navigator
2nd Lt. H. D. Hamilton, Bomber
2nd Lt. Ernest Benishmal, Bomber
Sgt. Adolph Klum, Engineer
Sgt. R. D. Gangwer, Radio Operator
Sgt. G. R. Petrochales, Gunner

Other questions as to respiratory conditions were asked. Three crew members had been grounded. All the others were in excellent condition.

Q. (by Major Warren) Would you submit a statement of whether the pilot and crew were in condition, and as to whether or not you were personally acquainted with the pilot and the crew involved? Make a pilot fatigue statement.

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Will you have it before you leave here?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. (by Major Warren) Could you add an additional statement on recreational facilities, also. Title it "Recreational Facilities", include food, outside meal facilities, etc.

A. Yes, Sir.

TESTIMONY OF LT. BRADY

(Pilot)

Q. Will you briefly go through the brief-up before the flight on the evening the accident happened and tell what occurred during the flight and after your landing.

A. We arrived an hour before taking off time at the Operations Office. I found out that three of my enlisted crew members—the tail gunner, the radio operator, and the first engineer—were grounded for that flight. I understood that it was a combination of inoculations and colds. The radio operator was sicker than the others. Also, that evening, we were given more detailed information concerning the weather than usual and, inasmuch as we were scheduled for a 25,000 foot bombing mission and the ceiling was down around 10,000 feet previous to take off time, we were instructed to stay in a local area and south until dispersion of that weather which was described as a temporary weak front, I believe. My Assistant Radio Operator did not want to go up as Radio Operator, but I had been told by my regular Operator that the boy could do the job and that he had more ability than most, so he went. We took off at 0020, climbed to 7,000 feet. That is where we reached the ceiling. I planned to drop my bombs at a lower altitude and stay in a local area, but when I saw that the ceiling was at 8,000 feet, I thought the best thing to do would be to climb through the ceiling and wait until the weather cleared up and do my regular mission from 25,000 feet. We went to 14,000 feet but were still in the over-cast, and headed south to check the weather there, as the south was given as the alternate flying area. I proceeded on the course that the navigator gave me and went to Delta and I would judge 50 or 60 miles south of Delta. In that area, I found much turbulence, sleet, snow, and ice, so I returned to the Wendover area and was able to know my general position because of the brief periods when I could get very clear signals on the range and then it would be there were periods when I got absolutely nothing. On several occasions I was able to reach almost into the station on the beam before precipitation noise broke it all off, so that I lost my position again. I remained in this area until about 6:00 or 6:30 in the morning. I made several attempts to contact the tower of the range station to secure weather information. That is, attempts were all made during the time when I was getting very clear reception on my radio—that is, the beam was very clear. At approximately this time, I had been flying my command set with the beam and I changed over to the radio compass. I had the co-pilot get the Salt Lake range on the command set. I attempted to contact the Salt Lake range station while I continued flying a bi-sector, heading out in that direction. I flew for sometime before I remembered the automatic control on the radio compass. When I had remembered that, I thought that we had gone too far to risk coming in on that and circling over the field. It must have been 7:30 or 8:00 o'clock when I climbed up to 17,000 feet and noticed that the top of the over-cast was beginning to clear. I attempted to orient myself on the Salt Lake range but the radio reception was so bad I was unable to do so. About this time I

cut my number two engine, salvaged my bombs, had all the crew get their parachutes on, located the medical kits, and attempted to locate the emergency rations. I estimated that I had a supply of gas that would last me until about 10:00 in the morning. It must have been about 9:00 when we located that hole in the over-cast which was the first break we had seen. We were able to discern a road through that hole, so I figured it must be fairly clear. We descended immediately. I found the ceiling in this little valley between 1500 and 2000 feet. I made one wide circle of the area at about 800 feet above the terrain, saw that was the only logical field, and landed wheels up. When we landed, there were pilot and co-pilot in the pilot's compartment. In the radio room were three men seated and three men on the floor with life preservers and parachutes packed around them. There were no injuries.

Q. Could you hear this tower at all?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Were you tuned on the Wendover range?

A. That is right, Sir.

Q. Were you trying to get weather from them?

A. When I tried to get weather, I tuned to the tower.

Q. Were you instructed to go to Las Vegas?

A. That is right, Sir. When I went down there to check the weather south, I found so much turbulent activity that I turned back. I just thought somebody went wrong.

Q. Did you make more than one attempt to go south?

A. No, Sir.

Q. What was the weather west of here?

A. I did not go over in that direction.

Q. Was Boise open that night?

A. I believe not. I feel sure that we were instructed not to go there.

TESTIMONY OF LT. BRADY

(Pilot - Re-called)

Q. What was the top altitude you went?

A. 18,000 feet, Sir.

Q. Why didn't you go higher?

A. Because I took the word of the weather forecast that we had that the whole thing would dissipate.

Q. Who told you that the ceiling thickness was 2,000 feet?

A. My co-pilot.

Q. Did they tell you that Southern California and Arizona were open?

A. No. I believe we found that out later.

Q. Did you receive the forecasting?

A. No, Sir. It was verbal.

Q. Did your co-pilot have a copy of the forecast when he came to the ship?

A. No, Sir. That was before they started doing that.

TESTIMONY OF LT. FREECE

(Co-Pilot)

Q. When you tuned on the Salt Lake range were you able to identify them?

A. We called them several times, but I could not receive any favorable message. There were only one or two times that I could hear the mike button. There was a man in Evanston who was tuned on short wave and said he heard me call Salt Lake and heard them answer, but I could get no answer.

(Re-called)

Q. You went to the weather office?

A. I did, Sir.

Q. Where were your best outs?

A. South, Sir. Las Vegas was the best.

Q. What areas were there that you felt confident would be safe?

A. It seemed that any where south of here would have been all right.

Q. Why did you think so?

A. That is the impression we received from the weather man. There were at least two other pilots there. The officer (I am sure it was an officer) told us that there was a ceiling of 2,000 feet.

Q. Are you sure that it was an officer you talked to?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was it a weather officer.

A. I am not sure.

Q. You are firmly convinced that after 2,000 feet of over-cast you would come out in the clear?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Where did you find the over-cast?

A. About 7,000 feet above sea level. I told the pilot that if it was only 2,000 feet thick, we might as well climb up and then come down and do our bombing. We stayed up there for several hours. I would say until 3:00 or 4:00 in the morning.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. EGAN

(Control Tower Officer)

Q. Capt. Egan, will you give the entire proceedings of the night concerned?

A. The ship took off at 0035 on a local training flight. The pilot was briefed before the flight by the squadron operations officer, in which he was told the weather south would remain good. At that time, we suspected frontal activity on the field sometime during the period.

Q. (by Lt. Col. Preston) What kind of mission was it?

A. Local instrument flying. The co-pilot checked up a landing condition. At that time, he was given the same information—that both Millford and Las Vegas would remain open. We had no radio contact with the ship at all—probably caused by snow static. Another thing on the weather (it was just about 2:00 A.M.) the field was wide open prior to the frontal activity that came in. We had a ship that failed to land from the 6:00 to midnight shift which was flying in the Salt Lake vicinity. It was about then that he landed at Millford. We had no radio contact with that ship. We were receiving, but I had no contact with him. The ceiling at Las Vegas remained open.

Q. (by Major Warren) At 2:00 the weather was unlimited?

A. It was C.A. U.V. at 2:00 A.M. I believe it was about 3:30 when she started snowing.

Q. (by Lt. Col. Preston) It was clear and unlimited when he took off?

A. No. There was an overcast. I believe he reported an overcast at 7,000 feet.

Q. (by Lt. Col. Preston) He went ahead and entered it?

A. Yes, he tried to break through but stopped at 18,000 and started milling around in the local area. We heard him call the tower on numerous occasions but we were unable to get through to him on either voice or ground station. We had a call from him at 6:00. He was again calling the tower and again at 7:40. The volume of the call would place him in the local area, but both the tower and the ground station were unable to get through to him and that was apparently the time he took off for Salt Lake. I believe it was at 8:10 and there were holes in the overcast and he landed at 9:20.

Q. (by Lt. Col. Preston) How long was the mission scheduled for?

A. 12:30 to 6:00 — five hour mission, I believe. He made contact with us through telephone.

Q. Was any effort made to contact the ship and send him south?

- A. Yes, we made attempts to give him the weather quoted. I don't remember the time. We put out the local ceiling and advised him to go to Las Vegas.
- Q. (by Lt. Col. Preston) What was reported in the briefing?
- A. Millford and Las Vegas were given as open.
- Q. (by Lt. Col. Preston) Why did he continue to circle here until 7:40? Might be low on gas!
- A. There is a conflict on the story. He went south to check the weather and I think some activity was encountered and he turned around. As I remember, he made other attempts to go south at 7:40.
- Q. (by Major Warren) The pilot was not briefed right because he was not told that south-west was open.
- A. (by Lt. Col. Preston) I think the error was in going up in this stuff.
- Q. (by Major Persons) Sgt. Smith had just talked to some of the pilots who had just landed and they told him that the ceiling was about 2,000 feet thick and he told the pilots.
- Q. (by Lt. Col. Dippy) I think our weather man made a mistake in telling this, because this weather here is very changeable.
- Q. (by Lt. Col. Preston) Did the Operations Officer instruct this pilot to go up to his mission?
- Q. (by Col. Alkire) The forecast intimated that the frontal activity would clear soon. Apparently the conditions they ran into were that the southern tip moved in ahead of the northern. The forecast indicated nothing but mild turbulence and not the pile up.
- Q. (by Lt. Col. Preston) The Operations Officer should tell the pilot where he could get out on top.
- Q. (by Col. Alkire) Why did they discontinue written forecasts to be given to the pilots prior to the take off, which was used at Walla Walla?
- A. That was stopped when we came here/

TESTIMONY OF LT. WESTFALL

(Weather Section)

- Q. Will you give us briefly what you have? Read over the forecast given to the squadrons that night.
- A. (The material was read by Lt. Westfall.)
- Q. The outs were given here and there?
- A. Southern Utah, Southern Nevada, and Southern California.
- Q. Was Elko open?
- A. I don't believe it was that evening. Usually it is lower there than here. It had only a ceiling of 500 feet.
- Q. Did you give a picture of outs with the weather?
- A. The ceiling was 5,000 feet at 12:30 and it remained that way until about 4:30, with the snow coming down and at 5:30 it dropped to 6,000 and then to 1,300 in the early hours of the morning. The rain was more steady than we had anticipated.
- Q. The front was more severe than you had anticipated?
- A. I think it dissipated and settled here.
- Q. It hung in more?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- Q. Did you forecast a ceiling 2,000 feet thick?
- A. No, Sir.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ELTON

(Briefing Officer)

Q. Would you tell your story?

A. The cabin crew that was flying on the mission were informed that a local front would pass through this area sometime during their scheduled mission. They were informed that weather conditions would clear rapidly after the passage of the front. Las Vegas was their alternate airport. They were instructed to go there if they found the weather worse than was scheduled.

Q. Did you assign any other alternatives?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Would you say that the pilot disobeyed your orders by waiting around four hours?

A. No, Sir.

Q. What R.P.M. and manifold pressure?

A. 1800 and 28 inches--27 inches with one for boost.

Q. What was the exact mission of that particular crew for the period?

A. 0030 to 0230. Local instruments. One hour each for pilot and co-pilot. 0203 to 0300. Ascend 25,000 feet. 0300 to 0500. Local bombing on Range PT-5. 10 bombs. 0500 to 0600. Instruments. Descend and land.

Q. You knew it was going to be instrument condition that night?

A. Yes. I told them to fly local and call the tower and get clearance. In the event that weather closed in here, the pilots were to get in contact with the radio control tower to receive a clearance at an even altitude.

Q. How many crews did you have out?

A. Three crews out.

Q. What arrangements were made to avoid planes coming in together?

A. They were assigned different altitudes. This crew was assigned the even altitudes.

TESTIMONY OF SGT. GAWNER

(Assistant Radio Operator)

Q. Did you, at any time on the night of the accident, enter the net of the radio tower?

A. I did not, Sir. The first time it was given a repeat. He gave me a repeat and that was the last I heard for the rest of the night, for the noise.

Q. Your radio was functioning?

A. Yes, Sir. I had it on the ground station.

Q. What did you send to the ground station?

A. I did not send any messages because I never got any replies.

Q. Did you monitor during the entire flight?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you scout for other frequencies?

A. Yes, Sir. I tried almost everyone I could. I got no contact. Just before we landed, I tried to get into the net again.

Q. How much experience have you had?

A. A few hours at Cowan and other flights.

Q. What experience have you had here?

A. Every time I go up, I take over part of the time.

Q. You actually have gone on successful missions?

A. Yes, Sir.

COPY

I certify this is a true copy.

BASE WEATHER STATION
Army Air Base
Wendover, Utah

Thomas C. Council
THOMAS C. COUNCIL
1st. Lt., Air Corps

319.1

December 23, 1942

SUBJECT: Forced Landings of B-17s, with Weather Involved.

TO: Regional Control Officer, First Weather Region.

1. In accordance with BCO Memorandum Number 16, dated Nov. 22, 1941, submitted below is informal report on forced landing of two B-17F aeroplanes which occurred at approximately 0800P, December 23, 1942.

2. AR 425349 took off from Wendover 0035P, with approximately 9 hours fuel aboard, on a local flight with alternate airport Las Vegas. At the time of take off the field was overcast at 9 thousand feet mean sea level. There were no contacts with the plane, and the first news of the aircraft was when it was heard flying about the vicinity of Mt. Pleasant, Utah (approx. 90 mi. SSE of Salt Lake City) near 0700P. Attempts were made by local residents of Mt. Pleasant to light the field by means of automobile headlights, and the plane attempted a landing at 0730P, but landed short of the field. However, no one was injured, and no damage was done to the plane.

3. AR 425291 took off from Wendover 0050P, with circumstances at time of take off same as in paragraph 2. The plane was unheard of until after sunrise, when it was reported having made a belly landing at Evanston, Wyo. about 0830P. (approx. 70 miles NNE of Salt Lake City). This plane will require a major overhaul, but there were no injuries to the crew.

4. Weather was poor at Wendover and vicinity at the beginning of these flights, and grew worse with time. The written forecast of this station was essentially correct as to the conditions, though ceilings and visibilities were lower at times than called for. However, all planes had alternate fields to the south (as shown on the forecast, and as given the men before take off); and all alternates stayed open. All planes, if unable to land at Wendover, were to proceed south, preferably to Las Vegas, and two planes did land at Las Vegas. It is not known why these planes did not do likewise.

5. Enclosed are true copies of the local weather forecast (there are no written clearances for "local" flights), and pertinent teletype sequences.

6. This report was prepared within a few hours after the accidents, and details are not too definite at this time.

THOMAS C. COUNCIL
1st. Lieut., Air Corps
Base Weather Officer

Incls: 2

1 true copy forecast

1 set teletype sequences, true copies

CONFIDENTIAL

Forecast for Wendover and Vicinity from midnight to
1000 PWT, December 23, 1942

A weak occluded front will reach this vicinity approximately at 0200 PWT and it will begin to dissipate along a line thru this station during the period. Continued overcast in this area with ceiling about 8-9 thsd msl and intermittent light precipitation. Snow showers in the mts. with ceilings of 6 thsd in the mts. to the north. Continued overcast in Southern Idaho with light snow showers. Visibility will remain over 10 miles throughout the period. Surface winds will range from 5-10 mph. Aloft winds will be 230 degrees up to 8 thsd above surface veering to 270 degrees and increasing to 35 mph at 15 thsd above surface. Alternate flying areas: Southern Utah, Northern Arizona, Southern California. Moderate turbulence in the frontal zone; otherwise light- icing in clouds and precipitation. Air mass following front is unstable.

CWG.

I certify the above is a true copy.

Alfred R. Westfall, Jr.
ALFRED R. WESTFALL, JR.
2nd. Lieut., Air Corps
Assistant Base Weather
Officer

TESTIMONY OF S/SGT. GALLAGHER

(Weather Section)

- A. Sir, I was on duty until 12:00 and made this forecast.
- Q. Was there any time the ceiling thickness was forecast?
- A. Usually the thickness is quite great in this type of weather. Boise is the only one which you can use. I did not have any idea of the thickness. Most of the men came in after I went off duty.
- Q. There was nothing unusual which appeared that night that was not forecast?
- A. No, Sir. I made the forecast that night.
- Q. Usually the ordinary fact is that the northern part is more rapid in clearance than to the south?
- A. Several pilots came to me the night before and they asked whether they would be flying the next night and I told them I did not think they would. That night they asked what had happened that I had changed my mind. I told them that I still thought they should not go up.
- Q. The whole thing is on the brief-up for all to read it. Las Vegas was open all night and designated as the best area.
- A. I talked to the pilot and he said that he encountered turbulence to the south.

FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) AAF
OFFICE OF THE SQUADRON SURGEON

December 31, 1942,
AAF, Wendover Field, Utah.

C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E

I certify that on the evening of December 22, 1942 at or about 2330, I examined the officers and enlisted men of Crew #82 of this squadron, consisting of:

2ND LT JOHN D. BRADY	PILOT
2ND LT JOSEPH F. PELECE	CO-PILOT
2ND LT HARRY M. CROSBY	NAVIGATOR
2ND LT HOWARD D. HAMILTON	BOMBARDIER
SGT. ADOLPH BLUM	ENGR
SGT. ROLAND D. GANGWER	ASST RAD OP
SGT. GEORGE R. PETROHELOS	ARMER GUNNER

I further certify that at the above stated time the following combat crewmen were grounded because of nasopharyngitis, acute, mild:

SGT. SAUL LEVITT	RAD OP
SGT. HAROLD E. CLANTON	ASST ENGR
SGT. HARVEY R. MATSGER	GUNNER

I further certify that,

1. The officer and enlisted crews were examined for evidence of flying fatigue, alcoholism, and upper respiratory infection and that no evidence of these were found.
2. I am personally acquainted with every member of the officer and enlisted crews and have been so acquainted for the preceding four weeks.
3. Recreation facilities for the combat crews are adequate.
4. Mess facilities for combat crewmen are adequate at anytime during the 24 hour period during which this squadron is flying.

Wendell C. Stover
WENDELL C. STOVER,
1st Lt., Medical Corps,
Squadron Surgeon, (AME)

SPECIALS

WV SPL 230052P E 500R- 132/34/2912/992

SLC SPL 230150M PIREPS ICG 80 TO 120 HSL SL TO ZE

WV SPL 230305P E500S- 135/34/3012/991/MTNS OBSCD N

SL C SPL 230406M 450R- 112/47/3012/8/992

HM SPL 230515M ^{after} E200S- 135/32/27-28/990/SNW CIG

WV SPL 230759P 1306R-S- 112/32/32C/984/PCPN CIG MTNS OBSCD

ZE SPL 230340M E4009S- 135/38/35116 ^{after} /990/ PCPN VRY LGT

JL SPL 230922M E200S ^{after} - 32/32-2/PCPN VRY LGT VSBY N4

TCL SPL 230923M E1503S-R- 115/35/31125

TCL SPL 230907M E2508R- 115/37/29128/SNWC MTNS W VSBY 11/2

VZ SPL 230410M E500400 132/40/35 ^{after} 44/995

I CERTIFY THE ABOVE IS A TRUE COPY

Alfred R. Westfall, Jr.
ALFRED R. WESTFALL, JR.
2nd. Lieut., Air Corps

after

230330E
SL C @/ 122/41/33110/990/MOON CISC VSB THRUOVC
WV E500 132/34/324/992

JL E300150 37/30146R
VZ E700500 125/43/22117/992
MD E6000 139/39/20119/999
NP @/ 149/42/3122/003/THN SPOTS
LQ C -@/ 152/45/26115/999
ZE 350 135/40/34117/990/CIG RGD
HM @/700 149/27/25119/990
TCL @/600 159/38/35113

230430E
SL C950 112/42/320/988
WV E500R- 133/35/2846/992

JL E300150 37/292/MOON DMLY VSB THRU OVC
VZ SPL E6000R- 115/44/23120/992
MD E6000 139/40/20115/999/ *NP ETS @ 149/41/2126/002/THN SPOTS after*
LQ C-@/ 146/44/27114/998

ZE 5000 129/41/31110/998
HM E800 135/30/26117/990/OCNL THIN SPOTS
TCL @/ 132/39/36119

230530E
SL C 550 112/47/3020/990/ 503 0709
WV SPL E500 135/34/302/991/ 901 5009

33 after
JL E350 35/347/MOON DMLY VSB/ 803 5005
VZ E4500R- 132/40/351121/995/505 6009
MD E6000 139/40/21116/999/ 400 5706
NP 900 146/39/21118/000/ 202 0419
LQ FINQ

ZE E400 135/38/34118/990/ 503 5006
HM E800 129/31/26115/992/ 303 5006
TCL @/ 112/37/3012/ 604 0206

230930E

SL C SPL 650 108/40/35120/984
WV E2506S- 112/32/31-25/984

JL E300R- 33/32-7/R-MIXED WITH SNW
VZ E650 105/40/26121/986/BINOV
MD E600 132/39/201-16/995
NP -0/650 142/39/24115/998
LQ C 0/ 152/40/24-14/998

ZE E2507R- 119/35/34119/983
NM E1000- 139/27/2618/985
TCL 5000 115/35/301-5/00NL L- 800

231030E

SL C 250R- 108/38/361-15/984
WV 230730P E1506S- 112/32/320/984/SNW CIG MTS OBSCD

JL SPL E501/25F32/32-2
VZ E650 105/40/271-22/986/BINOV
MD E600/0 139/39/21115/998
NP -0/550 142/39/211-14/998
LQ C 0/ 163/38/24-13/000

NM E1000S- 132/27/261-7/984
TCL E500L- 115/37/291-14/SNW SHWS MTNS W

231130E

SL C 2000R- 102/38/351-15/983/ 605 0209
WV SPL E1306R- 105/32/320/PCPN CIG NTNG OBSCD THIN SPOTS/ 605 5009

JL E 3000- 32/32-2/PCPN VRY LGT VSDY N 4/ 807 5208
VZ E650/0 112/39/251-22/987/ 201 5266 RCVNO 3117.5 3105
MD E0/0 135/39/241-19-/995/ 000 5596
NP -0/ 159/38/21112/998/ 303 0429
LQ C 0/ 163/39/241-3/000/ 102 0206

ZE FING

NM E1000-7- 129/28/271-4/983/ 903 5009
TCL E1300R- 115/35/311-9/ 603 5009

230630Z

SL C 270R- 119/44/32176/991

WV E3005- 135/34/30C/992/MTNS OBSCD N

JL E300 37/329/MOON DMLY VSD

VZ E600400 125/36/34-11/992

MD E800600 135/39/21112/998

NP E850 149/39/2118/000

LQ C @/ 152/44/26-9/999

ZE SPL E3007R- 132/38/33110/990/CLDS TFC MTNS E

NN E600 135/32/27-8/990

TCL E600/O 122/38/305

230730Z

SL C 450R- 119/41/33118/990/PCPN VRY LGT

WV E3000- 135/32/31-4/991/MTNS OBSCD N

JL SPL E300R- 34/3419/R- MIXED WITH S-

VZ E700 115/38/-21-/988

MD E800600 135/38/21117/996

NP E00 139/39/2121/998

LQ C @/ 149/44/26-6/998

ZE E3007R- 129/37/35110/988

NN E2005- 135/30/28-7/989/ENW CIC

TCL SPL E600/L- 125/37/2914

230830Z

SL C SPL 550R- 112/39/35121/9 5/PCPN VRY LGT MOON DI-C VSD THRU OVC

903 0709 94155 35

WV E3005- 119/32/32-3/986/MTNS OBSCD N/ 90602 5009 94129 25

JL E300R- 34/3118/PCPN VRY LGT/ 03 5005 22

VZ E650 112/40/27117/9 7/ 91201 5009 94195 34

MD E800 123/35/22117/995/ 905 5506 94424 37


NP E800 142/41/2120/998/ 605 5419 94322 37



LQ FINO


ZE E2507R- 122/37/34122/986/ 903 5005

NN E3005- 125/30/28-10/985/NO BRKS VSD/ 80502 5006 94193

TCL E600/L- 122/34/32115/PCPN INTNT/ 90399 6209 94296 34







Group II

672 2209 ACCIDENT

200

WFO 224 128 DONT RADIO

WENDOVERFIELD UTAH 240150Z

CONVINCING GENERAL AAF WASH DC

WFO 2242 PERIOD 100 TH BOMB GROUP H WENDOVER UTAH STOP IN ACCORDANCE
WITH AAF REGULATIONS 62 DASH 14 THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY REPORT
OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT AND DAMAGE IS SUBMITTED A 23 DECEMBER

STANTON WYOMING B PILOT JOHN B BRANDY 2ND LT AG AUS WENDOVER

AIR FIELD UTAH C LANDING ACCIDENT PLANE RUNNING L W ON GASOLINE

PILOT INTENTIONALLY LANDED WITH WHEELS RETRACTED BECAUSE OF TERRAIN AND
SNOW ON GROUND/NO INJURY SUSTAINED BY ANY MEMBER OF CREW ON BOARD

B LOCAL TRAINING FLIGHT F UNKNOWN G 42 DASH 5291 DASH B DASH 277 H

WENDOVER AIR FIELD UTAH I AIRPLANE MAJOR OVERHAUL J NO FAILURE OF

MATERIAL K TRANSFERRED TO OGDEN AIR DEPOT FOR REPAIR OF SALVAGE L

UNKNOWN M AAF CG NOTIFIED

COBOMOH 100 WENDOVERFIELD UTAH

2nd in AA Mag Gen 242033Z

20

DISTRIBUTION

AFATC	AFTSW
AFTAS	AFWSP
AFBBS (BAG)	AFPRO
AFBMP (3 CYS)	AFBFO
AFDBS (3 CYS)	
AFDB	

DIRECTOR, AAF
DIR, FLIGHT SAFETY

1942 DEC 26 AM 11 02

43-12-23-14

43-12-23-14

